The Role of Judicial Literacy in Climate Change
Abstract
As climate change litigation increasingly emerges as a crucial instrument in global environmental governance, courts are frequently tasked with the interpretation of complex scientific and technological evidence. This paper critically investigates whether legal frameworks genuinely shape the global response to climate change or whether this response is becoming more influenced by corporate technological power, leaving courts struggling to keep pace. Through case studies such as Milieudefensie v. Shell[1], the paper argues that while the law seeks to serve as a check on both states and corporations, judicial responses often demonstrate a limited understanding of the technological systems that underpin contemporary climate claims—ranging from emissions targets to speculative carbon offsetting schemes as demonstrated in the decision in Milieudefensie[2].
The paper also examines the increasing influence of corporate-controlled data within climate litigation and questions how judges are adequately engaged with these critically. When courts heavily rely on expert testimony or corporate disclosures without possessing the literacy to scrutinise them effectively, legal accountability risks becoming more performative than substantive. This technological blind spot not only undermines the efficacy of climate law but also allows transnational corporations to subtly shape legal narratives surrounding climate change and sustainability, often without significant challenge.
By integrating environmental law, judicial studies, and the theoretical framework of Foucault’s power and knowledge, this paper advocates for a more profound investigation into how legal actors interpret—or fail to interpret—the technological landscape of climate governance. Ultimately, it argues that without climate-literate judiciaries, there is a risk for dangerous precedents and an overall delay in climate change action.
[1] Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell Plc (Case No C/09/571932 / HA ZA 19-379.
[2] Ibid.
